The Philebus presents a comprehensive epistemological and metaphysical view in two of that dialogue's most difficult passages (15b-18c, and 23c-28c). In particular, the method described in the first passage is used in the second passage to do metaphysics; and the metaphysical picture it uncovers is precisely the one needed to support the epistemological presumptions of the first passage. This 'circularity' is not vicious, but elegant; seeing it so reveals most about Socrates' preferred candidate for the (cause of) good in human life.
importance of knowing the right number of distinctions. We even see him, in the description of the Method, counting.
For each investigation, we should always posit one form (mi/ an i0 de/ an). . . then, we must look for two, as the case would have it, or if not, for three or some other number. And we must treat every one of those further unities in the same way, until it is not only established of the original unit that it is one, many and unlimited, but also how many kinds it is. For we must not grant the form of the unlimited to the plurality before we know the exact number of every plurality that lies between the unlimited and the one. (16d1, 3-
7)
In his illustration of 'speech', Socrates insists we know "neither its unlimitedness nor its unity" (17b7) until we know how many kinds of letter, or spoken sound, there are. 4 Whether being taught (as Protarchus was taught his letters), or discovering for oneself (as Theuth discovered phonetics), one "should in each case grasp some number that determines every plurality whatever" (18b1-2). Likewise in the case of music, we must also know how many (17c11-12) kinds of musical modes there are if we are to be musical. The point culminates in some telling wordplay: Knowing only that there is variety "you count for nothing (ou0 d' e0 na/ riqmon) since you have never worked out the amount and number (a0 riqmo\ n) of anything at all" (17e5-6).
5
If we turn to the metaphysics of 23c ff., the concern with counting is ostentatiousalmost slapstick. Although Socrates says we must "be very careful (dieulabei= sqai) about the starting point we take" (23c1-2), he is dreadfully clumsy in articulating that starting point, and even calls attention to this fact himself: "I must look like quite a fool with my distinctions into kinds and enumerations (sunariqmou/ menoj)" (23d1-2). Indeed he does look inept, having 'carefully' begun with a division into two, he immediately revises this to a division into three: "Let us make a division of everything that actually exists now in the universe into two kinds, or if this seems preferable, into three" (23c4-5). Doesn't he know 3/8/07
which is preferable? Clearly, Socrates is concerned to get right the exact number of different kinds we should divide reality into; for he then immediately goes on, as if he could not himself have anticipated it from the beginning, to ask if he might add a 'fourth kind ' (23d4) into the divisional schema. This result of this rapid revision of a 'careful' starting is that
Socrates counts.
When Socrates begs his interlocutor's patience in adding a fourth kind to his initial three, Protarchus' suggestion that they might need a fifth kind (23d9-10) begins the counting in reverse: not five (23e2), but "of the four let us take up three, and since we observe that of two of them, both are split up and dispersed into many, let's make an effort to collect those into one (e4 n) again" (23e4-7). 6 Thus Plato has Socrates (and Protarchus), in effect, counting up, two, three, four, five; and back down, not five, but four, three, two and one. Clarity of exposition would seem to demand that Socrates state explicitly from the first that we are in fact dividing everything existing into four kinds. No explanatory content intervenes here between the revisions -indeed, that is how the effect of counting is achieved. Certainly Plato at least knows where he is going, and could have had Socrates propose a four-fold division in the first place. Instead, determining the starting point involves a great deal of gratuitous enumeration -Socrates is even made to comment on this. The passage thus calls attention to the fact that it is respecting the methodological demand that we be precise about 'the numbers of things', and it echoes textually the original exposition of the Method, which deftly slipped in "one…two…three" in rapid succession (16d1-4, cited above).
B. Starting and Ending with One
According to the Method of 16c ff. we must begin with unity. "We have to assume that there is in each case always one form for every one of them [the existing things being investigated], and we must search for it, as we will indeed find it there" (16d3-5). Even
Theuth, who is "forced to start out with the unlimited" (18a8), and so illustrates the 'reverse', exploratory rather than expository, use of the Divine Method, cannot avoid this. 7 If he does not assume 'vocal sound' as some one thing, then his activity of bringing order to the 3/8/07
manifold sounds involved in speech could only be fruitless -for where on earth would he begin looking for things to organize, classify and relate to each other, and how would he limit his field? Any investigation must assume a single object or domain of investigation in order to get started. The initial injunction to start by positing some one thing applies equally to all uses of the method.
'Starting with one' is relevant at each step, for each distinction produces at least two new starting points, unities for further investigation. Once the object under investigation has been properly divided into two, three or some other number, "we must treat each of these ones in the same way" (16d7-9), to be divided into a definite number of parts or kinds. The counterpart of this, in the 'reverse' use of the Method, would be the recognizing of distinct kinds of similarity, and similarities between kinds. One "should in each case grasp some number that determines every plurality whatever, and from all of those finally reach the one" (18a9-b3). When describing the final state Theuth's investigations arrive at, 'one' appears three times in a single line (18d1).
When Socrates turns his hand to metaphysics, he employs precisely this procedure of starting with one, and of treating each division as itself a 'one' to be divided. He proposes as the object of inquiry 'everything existing now in the universe'; either he takes this as some one thing, or else he is attempting to establish this fact (depending on whether we take his position here to be expository or exploratory). 8 In either case, he divides the matter at hand into four, and carefully points out that he is selecting just one of these four to examine.
Instead of simply dealing with each of the four genera in turn, Socrates announces that it is his intention to do so; and he announces that his aim is to treat each as a unity to be divided.
"That the unlimited in a way is many I will try to explain now. The treatment of what has limit will have to wait a little longer" (24a1-4). These procedural remarks are not strictly necessary; but they effectively draw our attention to the method Socrates is following.
Socrates is then satisfied with his rough account of the 'unlimited' when -having adduced examples in order to illustrate varieties of unlimitedness -rather than the "needless length of going through a complete survey of all cases", he can instead find some "mark of 3/8/07 the nature of the unlimited" (24b7-8). The characteristic uniting the whole class of 'the unlimited' is "admitting of more and less" (24e7-25a2). All such things are grouped as a unit, Socrates says, "in accordance with our earlier principle, that for whatever is dispersed and split up into a multitude, we must try to work out its unifying nature" (25a2-4). This is in accordance with the Divine Method's claim that mere recognition of infinite variety leaves us infinitely ignorant. 9 The 'earlier principle' it picks up on, however, is at 23e: we must, "collect them into a unity again [e4 n pa/ lin e9 ka/ teron sunagago/ ntej, e5], in order to study how each of them is one and many" (23e4-6)." 10 And studying how each one is one and many is the essence of the Divine Method.
To further belabour the methodological self-consciousness, Socrates later regrets that he failed to find what marks out the unity in the many kinds of limit. "About limit, on the other hand, we did not trouble ourselves, neither that it has plurality nor whether it is one by nature"; to which Protarchus replies, "Why should we have done so?" (26d5-7). They should have done so in order to comply with the strictures of the Divine Method they are following, if they are to get a full understanding of the matter at hand, and be confident about the distinctions they have made up to now.
C. Mutual Illumination
Theuth will know he has done his work rightly when he can set out his phonetic system by showing the variety in each of the unified kinds that together make up spoken sound:
seeing that none of us would understand any one of them on its own, without all the others, he considered this the bond that somehow makes all these things one; and he pronounced the single skill that covered them all 'grammar'. (18c7-d2)
Parts are mutually explanatory of a whole; and they make sense of each other as well. We know that we have the right parts, and they are parts of a genuine whole, because while in isolation each part may be incomprehensible, together with its relevant parts in the 3/8/07
appropriate context, its own nature becomes clearly defined and comprehensible. Theuth's more difficult task highlights the crucial importance of seeing the relations between parts, of understanding how they relate to one another in order to form a unity.
Each of the letters -elements or parts -becomes intelligible when all are jointly considered in their relations to each other. 12 This aspect of mutual illumination arises in the ontology, in an unfounded and otherwise irrelevant claim that follows Socrates' apology for having "omitted to collect together the class of limit" (25d6). Socrates goes on:
But perhaps it will come to the same thing even now if, through the collection of the Philebus. The Divine Method is introduced with a preamble about trivial and serious troubles raised by the principle "that the one is many, the many one" (14c8):
When, my young friend, the one is not taken from the things that come to be or perish….zealous concern with divisions of these unities and the like gives rise to controversy. (15a1-2, 6-7)
Plato then scrupulously avoids any further language of 'collection and division' -language such as figures most prominently in the Phaedrus, for example -while nevertheless describing something apparently similar, and with the same enthusiasm.
14 The metaphysics of Philebus 23c ff., by contrast, liberally engages in 'dividing' and 'collecting'. This activity is explicitly related to seeing unity in plurality, and thus refers us back to the discussion of method.
While Socrates rarely describes the Divine Method as a process of 'dividing', and never as 'collecting together', it is worth attending to the language he does use instead. For it is striking just how entirely general the language, for the most part, is. "We must search for" unity 15 in each case (zhtei= n, 16d2; skopei= n, d3); if we grasp it (metala/ bwmen, d3), we look for two, or three -but two or three whats? -and each of these in turn as one in the same way until it is not only established of the original unit that it is one, many and unlimited, but also how many it is (16d6-9). Theuth "distinguishes" (diesth/ sato, 18c2-3) a third kind of sound (tri/ pton de\ ei] doj, c2), and "divides" (dih| / rei, 18c3) one of these three kinds.
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Our second passage, by contrast, begins with a bold division: "let us divide everything actually existing now into two" (23c4, diala/ bwmen); and we do this by recalling that "the god revealed among/of beings [o1 ntwn, 23c10] the unlimited, on the one hand, and the limit" (23c9). How much difference is there between looking for "two, as the case may have it, or if not three" (16d3-4) and dividing "into two, or if this seems preferable, into three" (23c4-5)?
Indeed, so difficult is it to discern a relevant difference, that the language of 'division' is often read back into Philebus 16-18, although as we saw, it is not in fact used there.
One possible explanation of the difference in language, but similarity of procedure, might be that the divisions 17 into kinds 18 of Philebus 23c ff. represent only one manner in which we might search for and discover plurality within a unity. 19 We might instead distinguish parts within a whole, or discern aspects, properties, or characteristics of a unity.
These will be different ways of grasping many as one. The panta-ontology is a particular kind of application of the very general Divine Method. This relation of generic description specifically applied is suggested by Socrates' next remark, quoted in part above:
since we observe that two of them are split up and dispersed into many, let's make an effort to collect them into a unity again [e4 n pa/ lin e9 ka/ teron sunagago/ ntej, e5], in order to study how each of them is one and many" (23e4-6).
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Studying how each is one and many is precisely what the Divine Method of 16c ff. is designed to do. In this case, we study 'how each is one and many' by collecting into a unity what is dispersed. This current business of "collecting" just is grasping the unity in a plurality, in this case by identifying the common character. Thus 'the unlimited' is successfully collected together into one (e0 ti/ qemen, 25c8-11; sunhga/ gomen, 25d5-6), when its unity is marked out by the characteristic of 'more and less' (26d1-2). 21 This is established at 24e7-25a2: "Whatever appears to us to become more and less...and all things of that sort, we should place all such 3/8/07
things into the genus of the 'unlimited' as its unity." Only later is this called having 'collected together' the unlimited. One way to study unity-in-plurality is collection and division.
Thus we need not be dismissive of the divisions of the Sophist and the Politicus, 22 nor deny their relation to the Philebus' own divisions at 23c ff., in order to maintain that this process nevertheless does not exhaust 'dialectic' or the Divine Method -it is one of the legitimate ways in which knowledge comes to light through examination of complex unity. In spite of this, there are supposed to be insurmountable difficulties in taking the pair of terms to mean the same thing in both discussions. But we can see our way round these difficulties, I think, by taking the Method at 23c ff. to be at work upon its own metaphysical underpinnings.
The first difficulty arises from presuming that apeiron in the first passage refers to indefinitely many particular things; for it certainly does not refer to, or even contain, individual particulars (this dog, that cat) in the second passage. 24 But there is no need to suppose sensible particulars are the end-point of the analysis described in the Divine Method.
'Releasing them into the indefinite' can simply mean allowing that there are innumerable more distinctions one could, in principle, make, although in practice they would contribute nothing to understanding better the unity of the kind examined.
This, however, gives rise to a more sophisticated objection of a similar sort. The generalized problem seems to be that in the first passage, numerability is at issue, whether of
kinds or of individuals; whereas in the second passage 'limit' and 'unlimited' are not ways of counting, but objects of examination. These are, in fact, two ways of making out the difference. Striker puts them together this way (p.80):
The two expressions have, to be sure, the same meaning in both places, but they do not refer to the same thing. On p. 23-27, the kinds 'limit' and 'unlimited' are under discussion; the particular number of species and the indeterminate number of particulars [presumably at issue in [16] [17] [18] (which are simply 'many', not of a particular number) are cases of the pe/ raj and a1 peiron.
25
There is something right in the observation that 'limit' and 'unlimited' appear as kinds in the second passage, but are not under discussion as such in the methodology -this will be important for getting clear on what exactly the relation between the two passages is.
But why should this be an obstacle to understanding a consistent use of peras and apeiron?
Frede focuses on this difference, leaving to one side the questions of (in)numerability. In the first passage, she says, 'limit' and 'unlimited' are tools for the structural analysis of Kinds in the first passage, but are themselves 'kinds' in the second passage.
26
Thus 'limit' in the divine method indicates the limitedness of genus and species, while in the four-fold division it indicates the right measure of mixtures. The unlimited in the diharetic method means the unlimited differentiability that [203] underlies particular things, while in the four-fold division on the other hand it indicates the class of things which have neither measure nor number.
This does not yet seem to constitute a difference so fundamental that Plato must have been blind to suppose the two uses might be related to, and consistent with one another. 27 Frede's argument seems to rest on the presumption that different use of the terms implies different reference and so different meaning. As she puts it elsewhere, the methodological passage invokes peras and apeiron as criteria in analysis, 28 while the second, metaphysical discussion, takes these two as 'kinds' among 'anything said to exist now'. Apparently it is obvious that a criterion or constraint cannot be an ontological kind. 3/8/07
But is this obvious? Consider the matter from the other direction: If there are ontological kinds, constitutive of any existing, intelligible object, then their presence in objects would no doubt constrain our investigations into these objects, and have an effect on what coming to know those objects would require. Peras and apeiron are such ontological kinds, and that fact is relevant to appropriate modes of inquiry, and conceptions of knowledge. In this case, peras and apeiron constrain intelligible inquiry not by being criteria themselves, but by grounding epistemological principles about plurality.
29
Thus we see that even in the methodological discussion, peras and apeiron arise together only once -and they arise as a metaphysical justification for Divine Method's being the right way to come to know things. "What things are ever said to be consist of one and many, having in them together by nature limit and unlimited" (e0 c e9 no\ j me\ n kai\ pollwñ o1 ntwn twñ a0 ei\ legome/ nwn ei] nai, pe/ raj de\ kai\ a0 peiri/ an e0 n au9 toi= j su/ mfoton e0 xo/ ntwn, 16c9-10). 30 Because "things are thus arranged" -this is a claim about reality -there is a way for us to come to know multiplicities as unities. The limit and unlimitedness here are characteristics of how things actually are, they are aspects that any object of knowledge hasthat any existing thing has, insofar as it is intelligible; and they give rise to the demand to seek exact numbers of differences and similarities, 31 because seeking the exact number of parts/kinds/aspects forces us to discover exactly where and how differentiability is bounded.
It should, therefore, be no surprise to find that peras and apeiron turn up as gene of which 'anything existing' is composed in the rationalist ontology of 23c ff. 32 That is what they were in the first place.
Having bounded indeterminacy within it explains how it is possible and intelligible for us to grasp a single thing -spoken sound, pleasure, beauty -as a complex, differentiated unity. Because there are distinct, discoverable ratios, relations between undifferentiated qualities, there will be differences that matter, and some that do not. Some differences arise due to differences in intelligible, fixed relations; innumerably many differences simply exist, without constituting or contributing to the unity within or between kinds. 3/8/07
If we take seriously this sole occurrence of 'peras and apeiron' together, and its metaphysical character, then we see that the Divine Method had implicit within it a metaphysics -a metaphysics later spelled out in the Four-fold division. Although variations on apeiron appear throughout the passage, the pairing of limit and unlimitedness were only ever presented as metaphysical grounds for the Divine Method; it is these grounds that arise again in the panta-ontology. We saw linguistic reasons already for supposing Plato intends us to see that the metaphysical investigations are putting the Divine Method to use. These two together would mean that the Divine Method is put to use at 23c ff. in order to draw out precisely that metaphysical picture on which its legitimacy rested in the first place.
B. The Divine Method as Epistemology
This is why the panta-ontology's division of "everything actually existing now in the universe" (23c4) picks up the Method's claim to be relevant to "what is ever said to be" (16c9). 33 The Divine Method is as wide in its application as the panta-ontology. 34 "Anything in a technē which has ever been discovered, came to light due to" the Method (16c2-3).
Naturally, the illustrations of the Method invoke successful, completed and simple instances of the Divine Method -phonetics, music, possibly dance. These particular skills are familiar to Protarchus "from his own education" (17a9-b1), and the divisions, sub-divisions and relations are well-established, and can be easily recalled. But this should not make us suppose that the Method concerns only such well-established fields. "The gods," Socrates tells Protarchus, "have given us this way to inquire, and learn and teach one another" (16e3-4) -quite generally. This is repeated after the second illustration of the method: "At the same time they have made us realize that every investigation should search for the one and the many" (17d6-7).
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In particular, the Divine Method must be applicable at least also to 'man', 'ox', 'beautiful', and 'good' (15a5) -the abstract unities specifically said to generate the problems resolved by the Divine Method; and also to 'pleasure', 'knowledge' (18e8-19a2), to meet the practical aims of the dialogue. anything that could count as real -systematic and thorough -understanding. If we were to have knowledge of any of those objects, it would have the systematic character that our knowledge of phonetics or music currently has, and it would be acquired by carefully distinguishing parts, kinds, aspects, and so on. The sort of systematic knowledge we have in currently recognized fields or endeavours is the only sort of knowledge -it is the way of dealing with objects (or being able to deal with them) that allows us to count as knowledgeable (sofoi/ , 17b6, sofo\ j, 17c7). For "when you have grasped the unity of whatever else you are investigating, you have become wise (e1 mfrwn) about that" (17e1-3).
This will be the case, no matter how abstract our 'objects' -whether we are investigating sound, or knowledge, or good -or, as 23c ff. 'everything existing now'. This means that more than a method, the first passage is offering a description of knowledge. Our apparently merely methodological commitments are in fact an exercise in epistemology: the first passage tells us what being knowledgeable consists in, and hence what knowledge is. This is why, when the Divine Method instructs us to find distinctions which collectively bring out the unity of the plurality, the sort of plurality at issue is deliberately left vague; for the 'many' might be many parts, or many kinds, or many aspects; and the ways these unite to form a whole will vary correspondingly. It may be easier and more convenient to speak of the 'parts' which jointly comprise a whole, as Socrates does in describing the different colours (me/ rh, 12e7); but he also occasionally uses ge/ noj or i0 dea. 37 His most usual locution, however, is extremely abstract, contrasting 'one' or 'unity' with 'many', 'plurality', or 'number'. If Plato is doing epistemology, he is right to be reluctant to specify the kind of multiplicity characteristic of complex unities -it will simply be different in different cases. 38 Much later in the dialogue, Socrates praises dialectic extravagantly, and in spite of the fact that this is the first explicit mention of it, claims that "Clearly everyone would know what I am referring to now!" (58a1). It is hard to know why he expects everyone knows already what he means, unless he is referring to the remarks of 16c ff., picking up perhaps on the fact that the Divine Method was described as making all the difference between eristic and dialectical discussion (17a4). But the extravagant praise of this discipline, and in 3/8/07 particular the subsequent claim that it alone deals with real being (58a), 39 implies that the Divine Method is not only suitable for specific, eternal objects -beauty, sound -but equally, or even especially suitable for doing ontology.
Summary:
The idea, then, is that Divine Method can be 'the way to become wise' only if existing things are of a certain sort -namely, having limit and unlimitedness in them together by nature. Any methodology implies an epistemology -a story about what knowledge consists in, what mental state, or capacity, it is that we are aiming at that will count as successful. But, since it is knowledge we want and not a beautiful arrangement of ideas, epistemology in turn
implies something about what objects of (potential) knowledge must be like. Reality, or intelligible objects, must be such as to be comprehended or represented faithfully in this way -in the way specified by knowledge.
This connection is emphasised by Socrates' appeal of 'music' in both passages: at 17b-e, music is an intelligible complex unity, a monad and object of knowledge; at 26a, music is a 'mixture' of limit and unlimited, a bounded entity of proportionately related qualities.
Objects of knowledge, known through grasping their specific structures of one-and-many, can be such because they are indeed determinate measured relations between a specific subset of diverse qualities. Exactly what we had to assume at 16d, 40 in order to have confidence in seeking knowledge, is explained in the metaphysics of 23c ff., especially in the description of meikta.
Since knowledge consists in ascertaining the definitive relations between parts, kinds and aspects, we can infer that intelligible things must be such as to be known in this waythey must actually be constituted by determinate relations. In treating, as such, the categories of being constitutive of intelligible objects, the Divine
Method is used to lay out the metaphysical picture that underwrites the validity of the Method. Conversely, since the metaphysics underwrote the validity of the method in the first place, the metaphysical categories and structure manifest themselves in epistemological discussion as constraints and guidelines about counting and leaving uncounted -as the requirement to determine the definite number of distinctions appropriate from among the indefinitely many that might be made.
III. Is There Objectionable Circularity Built into the Metaphysics and Epistemology of the

Philebus?
In the order of exposition, Socrates declares that a certain method is necessary for acquiring knowledge. This has implications for the conception of knowledge at work.
Socrates then uses this method in order to understand the fundamental constituents (categories of being) of intelligible reality. When he does so, he finds that these basic principles of reality are just the sort that would justify the Divine Method being used, and first set out as the right way of coming to know anything.
Since a conception of what knowledge is, how intelligence works, and the nature of
what it works upon are jointly implied in the methodology, should we worry that the metaphysical picture at 23c ff. conveniently pops out simply because it was already built into the method used for discovering it?
There are two reasons, I think, why this dove-tailing of method and metaphysics need not worry us. First, we might consider the metaphysics as simply spelling out the views implicit in the methodology, with no claim to be doing otherwise. That is, Socrates is not offering us any further argument that reality is in fact constituted in the way described in the panta-ontology; the metaphysics is just one part of the Philebus's comprehensive picture of There is, however, another reason why we should not worry about the mesh between methodology and metaphysics, in this particular case. Unlike my 'vision-epistemology', Socrates' method does not determine the sort of reality it will find when employed, at least not at the most fundamental level. 41 If the universe were chaotic -not ordered at all -then the Divine Method could be expected to have found that, too. Its complete failure to articulate distinct parts or kinds and their relations, required for knowledge on this model of it, would have proved that reality was not so constituted as to be known according to the conception of knowledge informing the methodology. It could not have shown the universe to have some order and structure other than the embedded complex unities that the Method is designed to investigate; but then the notion of 'complex unity' is so general that anything short of chaos should be able to be discovered and described by it. 42 In a way, Plato is not building very much controversial into his conception of knowledge -at least he is not doing so here. The view aims no higher, and no more specific than the fundamental requirements for basic intelligibility. In allowing indeterminacy, and the innumerable distinctions this 3/8/07 makes possible, into his ontology, Plato in fact allows that reality may extend beyond our ability to make sense of it.
We could have divided "all existing things" differently, and so come up with a different metaphysical perspective -we could even have used the Divine Method to divide things differently; but that would not have shown us what goes into being a knowable thing.
Had we not been interested in finding our place in the universe, what we are and how we are situated, in order to see how the competing goods fit into such lives; had we also not needed some greater understanding of what Socrates' position is -of what he thinks reason is, and how he thinks it relates to the world, and relates us to the world; had we been interested in quite a different set of questions, then we might well have divided reality differently. 43 This is the dialectician's prerogative -and whether she has used it well shows in the clarity to be gained by looking at things carved up and related in the way she recommends.
IV. Failure of Dialectic?
By this measure of clarity, however, it may look as though the four-fold ontology makes a dismal showing. So far from illuminating anything else, it has often been considered a source of muddle and misunderstanding.
As I have tried to show, the metaphysics is opaque only if we lose sight of the kind of question it is trying to answer. There are in fact two tasks the metaphysical discussion must address: (1) implicitly, it should help us better understand the methodology, the epistemology implied by it, and in general the conceptions of mind and knowledge that
Socrates defends as better for us than pleasure; and (2) explicitly, the metaphysics should somehow move us forward in our debate between hedonism and ethical rationalism. It is specifically in order to show which of pleasure and reason/knowledge is "more akin to the good" (22d8) that Socrates introduces the metaphysical distinctions.
Does the metaphysics do either of these?
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Less noted in the general anxiety to sort out the details of the methodology and metaphysics is the fact that these passages shed most light on the conception of mind Plato is invoking, his conceptions of intellect, knowledge, and reason. Socrates gives a portrait of his candidate (the activity of soul that is truly grasping reality), completing it with a sketch of the pre-eminent case: ontological knowledge or understanding, etc. Intelligence, we learn, can tolerate a certain amount of 'resistance' from intractable variety, provided it patiently discerns what order there is to be found. Knowledge, in fact, needs there to be this complexity in its objects, since relating similarities and differences is what enables a mind to grasp a The conception of mind and knowledge embedded in a metaphysically grounded epistemology thus provides a framework for a reasonable ethical rationalism. In understanding how to order a human life, just as in understanding any other object, mind must not exclude all of the messy inexactitude familiar to us. The Divine Method suggested that 'human being' was a complex unity that had to be approached in the way handed down by the gods; this suggestion is confirmed later in the dialogue: we are ordered mixtures of limit and unlimitedness, and so are our lives (30b-c). But unlimitedness is not to be altogether excluded from any complex whole, including ourselves. 44 If pleasure is a source of 'unlimitedness' in the complex whole that we are, then it cannot and should not be excluded from a human life. It should be even embraced to the extent that it co-operates in constructing for ourselves a well-ordered soul, and over time a well-ordered life. • ---. Philebos: Übersetzung Und Kommentar. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997.
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for inquiry. The more generous answer, and the one I favour, would argue that one of the great features of the Divine Method is that it is at the dialectician's discretion how far to pursue the detailed investigation. Unless we need complete knowledge of the object under investigation, then we may pursue the analysis only so far as necessary to grasp the point being made in the argument. Luckily, in order to understand the kind of thing pleasure is, its relation to intelligence and their place in human life, we do not need to know all existing things in so much detail.
7 Cf., Hackforth 1945, 25-26. However his conclusion, that "Plato's notion that a One-Many can be dealt with by science in two alternative ways is incorrect" seems hasty. There is an important difference between exposition and exploration, between teaching and discovery, and the methods appropriate to each. Plato at least has it right that the different methods appropriate are related and deal with the very same material. How do we explain the sense in which new work turns up discoveries unless there is some sense in which we did not already have the thing discovered available to us -the unity of the object of study (we must lack it in the same sense in which we have it in teaching). Cf. also Gosling 1975, 86-7 and 171-2, who also notes this, and recognizes this need pose no difficulty.
8 So if we think of Socrates as here going Theuth's direction, and reformulating the injunction that 'when forced to start with a many...', then we might take 'ta\ nu= n o1 nta e0 n tw| panti\ ' (23c4) to be referring severally to each and every existing thing, of which we are trying to establish that they form a unified cosmos.
9 The dialectic here is actually slightly more complicated than this; see section D, below.
10 In full: "since we observe that two of them are split up and dispersed into a manifold, let's make an effort to collect them into a unity again [e4 n pa/ lin e9 ka/ teron sunagago/ ntej, e5], in order to study how each of them is one and many" (23e4-6). Note the repetition of di/ espasme/ non, e0 scism/ non and sunagago/ ntej in both texts. See section D for further discussion.
11
Of course all this only shows Plato depicting Socrates as asserting that he is availing himself of the principles set out by the Divine Method; it does not show Socrates actually engaging in the exhaustive collecting, dividing, inter-relating and grasping exactly 'how many' that we would expect from the description of the Method at 16b ff. This may be Plato's way of undermining the very suggestion he has
Socrates so overtly making: that we are now being obedient to the lessons learned in the Divine Method passage. Or, it could rather be a recognition that -as we will see later in the dialogueknowledge comes in degrees, and we are only 'closer to knowledge' (55d5-8) to the extent that we do 3/8/07
has in mind" (Trevaskis 1960, 42) . We needn't be wedded to the centrality of classification in order to take the point on board.
20 As noted above, this is repeated at 25a2-4; see note 9.
21 "Although the unlimited also displayed many forms, it nevertheless appeared as one kind, marked out by having more and less" (26c9-d2). be when they do" (31b2-4); and these distinctions we do get in the discussion of falsity in pleasures.
Likewise, we find that kinds of knowledge are distinguished, at 55c-59d, partly according to their objects, but mostly according to their degree of manifestation of various aspects or characteristics of knowledge.
24 Meinwald, who is not sympathetic to the view, puts the problem more simply, but perhaps more contentiously: "on most views of 16b ff., the apeiron there (into which we release our ones when all possibilities for division have been exhausted) is the endless number of sensible individuals that are members of a given kinds (so that 'apeiron' refers to the endless number of sensible individuals that participate in a given Form). However, at 23b ff., 'apeiron' cannot possibly refer to the endless number of sensible individuals falling under a given kind." 31 To insist on the 'schematic' role of peras and apeiron in the metaphysics -to look at them as aspects which any existing thing must have -goes against Striker 1970, 76, in a way that is illuminating. She says that peras and apeiron must be considered both as objects and as constituents; and I agree with that, but not in the way she intends. The genus 'limit' is indeed an abstract, intelligible object, capable of being studied, understood, and so on; likewise, the genus 'unlimited'. And if this is right, they are objects, although abstract objects, each kind must itself 'have limit and unlimited in it'. So to take the class 'limit', we might point out that there are indefinitely many ratios, and infinitely many numbers;
distinguishing between ratios and numbers, between whole numbers and fractions, as such, might be a good way to understand this abstract object 'the class of limit'. But there are innumerable other ways one might want to conceive of the class as forming a unity. Conversely, the class of the unlimited must . That some such delineations could be exposed is indicated in the way that Socrates claims that they ought to have 'collected' together the classes of limit and unlimited in some way that they have failed to do.
32 It is true that in our first passage we continue to hear later of 'apeiron' (with the definite article: 16d7, e1, e2; 17b7, 17e3, 18a9, 18b9; no article: 17b4 (sound; again at 18b6), 17e4 (unlimitedly many), 18a8) and 'apeira' (16d6, 18e9, 19a2). But that is the last we hear of peras, limit. The 'unlimitedness' we get in the rest of the discussion is problematic. It is not clear whether it is a reference to unlimitedly many things, or the unlimitedly many potential divisions. Most often, in the rest of the discussion, apeiron is contrasted with 'one' or set alongside 'many', as the extreme other end from one to many, to indefinite/indefinitely many. The suggestion may be that 'having unlimitedness in it' is responsible for indefinite differentiations, and so for indefinite differences between any two particular things.
33 The a0 ei\ of 16c8 has an indefinite sense ('at any time'); nu= n at 23c4 picks this up, specifying 'at the time'. This latter should be taken inclusively, rather than as limiting the scope -it is always true of eternally existing things that they exist now; it is also true of any changing thing that it now exists, although it might not later. So the Method makes a claim on what is at any time said to be; the pantaontology is one of those times. namely, that the Divine Method is used on 'everything existing in the universe', if she thinks that ontology is its own special field -but then it is hard to make sense of the point of the contrast here between special fields and all of being.
35 So, Socrates' use of 'technē' is not restrictive in this portion of the Philebus, and should not be taken as contrastive -as if he thought there were some other way of getting some other kind of knowledge. See
